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DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-INJURIES ARISING OUT OF EmPLOYMENTWHETHER DEATH OP EMPLOYEE IS COMPENSABLE WHEN CAUSED BY FELONIOUS ACT DIRECTED AGAINST A THIRD PARTY-A

decision which will have

great impact on employers operating under the Illinois Workmen's Com1
pensation Act was recently handed down in the case of C. A. Dunham
2
Company v. Industrial Commission. In that case the employee, while on
company business was killed when the airplane on which he was a passenger
The explosion was caused by a bomb put on
exploded and crashed.
3
board the plane to carry out a man's plot to kill his mother. A surviving
daughter of the employee filed a death benefit claim with the Industrial
The Commission granted an award, but on review the
Commission.
circuit court set aside the award on the ground that her father's death did
not meet the statutory requirement that the death or injury must "arise
4
The Supreme Court of Illinois, on direct review,
out of" his employment.
reversed the judgment of the circuit court and confirmed the award when
it concluded that that prerequisite to recovery was satisfied.
The decision in the instant case depends solely on the interpretation
This initially empty
out of" the employment.
phrase has engendered much controversy in the application of workmen's
5
In the early days of these acts, many of the courts,
compensation laws.
in an attempt to define the expression, seem to have been hampered by
of the words "arising

their inability to free their interpretations from common law influences.
Thus, this condition of coverage by the acts became entangled with the
tort principles of fault, foreseeability and proximate cause; while at the
same time the social reasons for the legislation were afforded little recognition.6
1 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1957, Vol. 1, Ch. 48, § 138.1 et seq.
216 Ill. (2d) 102, 156 N. E. (2d) 560 (1959).
3 The instant case was a by-product of a scheme formulated by one Graham to
collect on his mother's insurance and to inherit her property by murdering her. For
this purpose, he planted a bomb in her baggage which exploded shortly after the
takeoff of an airplane in which she was riding, killing her and all others aboard
the craft. He was subsequently convicted and executed for the murders so committed.
4 The death or injury must "arise out of" the employment, and the employee must
be "in the course of" his employment: Ill. Rev. Stat. 1957, Vol. 1, Ch. 48, § 138.1.
It was stipulated in the case that the decedent was "in the course of" his employment, but both phrases must be independently satisfied in Illinois to support a recovery: Loyola University v. Industrial Commission, 408 Ill. 139, 96 N. E. (2d) 509
(1951) ; Scholl v. Industrial Commission, 366 Ill. 588, 10 N. E. (2d) 360, 112
A. L. R. 1254 (1937). For a list of other jurisdictions following this principle, see
99 C. J. S., Workmen's Compensation, § 208, p. 674, note 35.
5 Compare Cardillo v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 330 U. S. 469, 67 S. Ct. 801,
91 L. Ed. 1028 (1947), with Horovitz, "The Litigious Phrase: 'Arising out of' Employment," 3 NACCA L. J. 15 (1949).
6 Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law (Matthew Bender & Co., New York,
1952), § 6.50. See also Horovitz, "The Litigious Phrase: 'Arising out of' Employment," 3 NACCA L. J. 15 (1949), particularly note 5.
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"Arising out of" the employment has reference to the causal connec7
tion between the injury or death and the employment. Over the years
the courts have formulated several tests of this causal relation. One of the
earliest was the "proximate cause" test which was applied in Madden's
Case.s There recovery was allowed for an aggravated heart condition
only after the court concluded that there was a direct causal connection
between the injury and the claimant's work of dragging floor carpets.
Another test which achieved some currency was the "common hazard" test
framed in the dicta of McNichol's Case.9 There it was stated that "the
causative danger must be peculiar to the work and not common to the
Under this criterion, a travelling salesman could not
neighborhood."
recover compensation for an injury resulting from a traffic mishap, for
such a risk would be common to the public.10
Modern tribunals appear to have recognized that the fundamental
purpose of the workmen's compensation acts was being defeated by judicial
constriction of the meaning of the several legislatures, so many of the
later cases have taken a more liberal view of these statutes. This broadened
outlook has produced such yardsticks as the "increased risk,"" the
"actual risk,''12 and the "positional" or "but for" test. 13 The most
14
liberal of these, one which most courts have refused to adopt, is the latter.
Under it, the question asked is whether the injury or death would have
occurred but for the fact that the conditions and obligations of the employment placed the employee in the position where he was injured. The only
type of injury excluded from this test would seem to be the one inflicted
by another employee when motivated by personal vengeance. 15
7Angerstein, Illinois Workmen's Compensation (Burdette, Smith Co., Chicago,
1952), § 392; Reisenfeld, "Forty Years of American Workmen's Compensation," 35
Minn. L. Rev. 525 (1951).
8 222 Mass. 487, 111 N. E. 379 (1916).
9215 Mass. 497, 102 N. E. 697 (1913).
10 Hewitt v. Casualty Co. of America, 225 Mass. 1, 113 N. E. 572, L. R. A. 1917B
249 (1916).
11 Martin v. V. J. Lovibond & Sons, [19141 2 K. B. 227; City of Chicago v. Industrial Commission, 389 Ill. 592, 60 N. E. (2d) 212 (1945).
12 The leading case applying this test is that of Hughes v. St. Patrick's Cathedral,
245 N. Y. 201, 156 N. E. 665 (1927). The claimant there suffered heat prostration
while working in a cemetery. The New York Court of Appeals said: "Although the
risk be common to all who are exposed to the sun's rays on a hot day, the question
is whether the employment exposes the employee to the risk."
13Truck Ins. Exchange v. Industrial Accident Commission, 147 Cal. App. (2d)
460, 305 P. (2d) 55 (1957) ; Baran's Case, 336 Mass. 342, 145 N. E. (2d) 726 (1957) ;
Howard v. Harwood's Restaurant, 25 N. J. 72, 135 A. (2d) 161 (1957) ; Gargiulo v.
Gargiulo, 13 N. J. 8, 97 A. (2d) 593 (1953).
14 Larson, op. cit., § 6.40, note 6.
15 See Malone, "Workmen's Compensation," 8 Rutgers L. R. 97 (1953) ; Howard
v. Harwood's Restaurant, 25 N. J. 72, 135 A. (2d) 161 (1957).
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The rationale of the instant case fits none of these tests well. The
courts of Illinois formerly insisted that the quantity or degree of the
risk from which the employee sustained the injury must have been increased as to him, as distinct from the risk to the general public, before
such injury would be compensable. That, in substance, is the "increased
risk" test. 16 So, the court's ability to allow recovery in this case would
seem to be circumscribed by precedent. Nevertheless, a decision was
reached for the claimant by labelling the cause of the employee's death a
"risk of transportation."
It reasonably follows that, as the employee's
work required him to travel, he was exposed to the risks of transportation
to a greater degree than the general public. Consequently, his injury
satisfies the "arising out of" requirement of the statute. It is clear that
the validity of this logic depends upon the validity of the premise. Calling
the explosion of a bomb a transportation risk because it occurred on an
airplane implies that such an explosion is not as likely to happen in other
activities; but it was stipulated by the parties that an incident such as
this had happened only once before in the history of aviation. It must be
considered that the court viewed the cause of the employee's death to be
the explosion and crash of the airplane. The distinction between the
explosion and the crash perhaps can be criticized as dubious, but the court
held it valid and sufficient. If the cause was the explosion of the bomb
placed on board the plane, then the premise seems invalid. On the other
had, an airplane crash is indeed a "risk of transportation."
A typical difficulty in the court's path was the case of Borgeson v.
Industrial Commission.17 In that case, a salesman was injured when hit
by a stray bullet while on the street in the course of his employment.
Compensation was denied on the grounds that the injury did not result
from a risk of the work. In overruling the denial, the court stated that
when a man is required by his work to travel the streets, they become the
milieu of his work and he is exposed to all street hazards to a greater
degree than the general public. But one wonders what the result would
be if a secretary were hit by a stray bullet while sitting at her desk on
the third floor of a building.' s It logically follows that she would be
denied compensation because her job had not required her to be on the
street at the time of her injury, and her exposure to such risks was not
thereby increased over that of the general public. On the other hand, if
the "positional" or "but-for" test were applied to such a situation, the
solution is far less difficult.
16 Payne and Dolan v. Industrial Commission, 382 Ill. 177, 46 N. E. (2d)

(1945).
17 368 Ill. 188, 13 N. E. (2d) 164 (1938).
18

Larson, op. cit., § 10.11, note 6.
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The workmen's compensation acts are rooted in principles of social
morality and distributive justice. The enactment of these laws in the early
part of this century was a result of the unconscionable social conditions
produced by the development of industry. Thousands of workers annually
were prevented from supporting themselves and their families due to
industrial accidents. Recoveries at law by injured workmen were rare
because of the common law defenses of contributory negligence, assumption of risk, and the fellow-servant rule. Thus, these victims of industrial expansion were left remediless. To ameliorate this condition the
acts gave compensation to those incapacitated by work-connected injuries;
the cost was passed on to the consumers of the products and services of
industry.19 Reflection on the underlying policy of the legislation puts to
scorn the judicial limitations on recovery by needy and worthy claimants.
Equally illogical is the reiteration of such limitations while they are in fact
surpassed. Although the "increased risk" test has not been discarded, the
instant case appears to have stretched it beyond recognition in Illinois.
The courts in the future should take the opportunity which the present
holding affords to establish a broader and clearer criterion in harmony with
the objectives of the Workmen's Compensation Act.
R. K. O'REILLY

19 For a thoughtful discussion of this social policy, see Larson, op. cit., § 2.20;
99 C. J. S., Workmen's Compensation, § 5, p. 36; 58 Am. Jur., Workmen's Compensation, § 2, p. 575.

